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ABSTRACT 
In economies without friction, where money as a means of 
exchange has no role, the existence of the rate of interest 
would have no efficiency consequence. Once a friction that 
justifies the use of a means of exchange is introduced in the 
macroeconomic model, the inefficiencies resulting from the 
presence of the rate of interest become exposed. 
In search models, where money has a raison d’être, the use 
of money in trade when accompanied with conventional 
finance, is associated with two important inefficiencies. The 
first is the Friedman-Samuelson inefficiency. The payment 
of a positive (interest) rate of return on money, with 
guaranteed principle and return, motivates agents to 
economize on the use of cash in transactions. This reduces 
the volume of transactions below optimum. The substitution 
of real resources for cash would further reduce output. The 
second is Hosios inefficiency which results from the 
existence of externalities in search activities by agents. 
Failure to internalize such externalities would also reduce 
the volume of transactions below optimum. 
The paper argues that the switch to Islamic finance removes 
both inefficiencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional economics as stated by the classics and 
restated by neoclassics envisages a perfect model free from 
inefficiencies and instability. The history of the market 
economy, measured by this quality has been less than 
satisfactory. According to Wikipedia (2017), 24 recessions 
took place between the Free Banking Era to the Great 
Depression and 14 crises after the Great Depression and 
until the Great recession. 
Repetitive crises do not speak well for the classical and 
neoclassical doctrine. The faults of the theory served to 
coverup some basic problem with the market economic 
system and served to support the belief of those who uphold 
the superiority of the system. This factor is that neither the 
classical nor the neoclassical model allow for an incentive to 
hold money as a means of exchange. Both models assume 
perfect markets that exclude any friction which would justify 
the use of a medium of exchange. The nascent brand of 
search model, which provide such justification can be used 
to expose serious inefficiencies that would serve as a strong 
support to Islamic finance as both an alternative or a part of 
a reform plan.  
THE 1ST SHOCK TO THE DOCTRINE: THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 
The great depression gave prominence to the Keynesian 
revolution which helped in advancing economics to become 
matured as a social science while being dominated by two 
schools of thought that competed for both intellectual as well 
as political influence, namely the Keynesian and the 
monetarist schools. Economists, considered the rate of 
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interest as a price. Specifically, it is the relative price of 
present money to future money. You could rarely find an 
economist who would call for a zero price of anything, as 
prices serve as important tools in resource allocation and a 
coordination force among decision makers in the economy.  
The theory of value has been developed in a world without 
money. In order to construct an economic model where 
money can justifiably serve as a means of exchange, i.e., a 
monetary model, economists discovered that they must add 
a friction that becomes the raison d'être of money. Several 
models with friction sprang out for this purpose1. 
The amazing thing is that the neoclassical and Keynesian 
model, being devoid of frictions that justify the use of a 
medium of exchange, has hidden the inefficiencies related to 
the role of interest in the economy. Once a justifiable friction, 
like search cost is introduced, the nakedness of the emperor 
becomes apparent. 
HOW MONEY CAN BE INTRODUCED: BUILDING A SEARCH 
MODEL 
Barter exchange is associated with inefficiencies. The lack of 
double coincidence of wants, even with perfect divisibility of 
commodities would leave many exchanges inexecutable. The 
resulting number of exchanges under barter would be 
suboptimal. In order to solve this problem, the Walrasian 
general equilibrium model introduces an auctioneer within 
the arrangement of centralized exchange in order to reach 
equilibrium. All traders (buyers and sellers) in the economy 
meet in one place. The auctioneer cries a list of prices of all 
commodities and takes offers of sale and purchase. He 
allows trading only when quantity demanded is equal to 
                                                            
1 (Kiyotaki and Wright, (1991, 1993) and Kocherlakota (1998) 
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quantity supplied at the cried price. Traders would try to 
profit from price difference by arbitrage. They adjust their 
sale and purchase offers. Gradually equilibrium is reached 
through tatonnement. Such arrangement to reach general 
equilibrium, while conceptually wonderful, is absolutely 
impractical. The introduction of money would be a good 
substitute. This would require a different setup where 
money use can be justified. Unfortunately, the classical 
perfect model has no place for money as a medium of 
exchange. 
To carry on the intellectual exercise further, let us assume 
that we no longer have an auctioneer, and no longer have a 
place in which all traders gather. Centralized exchange 
would not be possible. The process of arbitrage would be 
interrupted, and degenerate the exchange economy back 
into barter. The Walrasian numéraire will be exposed as 
incapable of being used as a medium of exchange. We must 
therefore do away with perfect exchange model and move 
forward to a model with some friction that justifies the use 
of a medium of exchange. The best alternative to introduce 
transactions costs that results due to structural reasons 
would be to use search models. This would give a strong 
justification for the use of money, and allow for a step 
forward towards consistent monetary economics. 
Search models use frictions in the goods market to justify 
the use of a medium of exchange. Intuitively, the mere 
introduction of transactions costs, by assuming costly 
information and consequently, costly search for prices would 
be sufficient. However, economists as usual would want to 
imbed into the model something that results in costly 
information. That gave rise to search models. 
The nascent search literature contains many different 
variants of a basic search model, each designed to deal with 
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some application2. On the one hand, Reinganum (1979) 
introduces identical buyers while firms have different 
constant marginal costs. The equilibrium distribution of 
prices is attached to firms’ costs. On the other hand, Rob 
(1985) introduces identical firms while buyers facing 
different search costs. Carlson and McAfee (1983) admits 
buyers’ heterogeneous search costs and firms’ constant 
marginal costs, only under assumptions to enable the 
solution of his model. B´enabou (1993) extends Carlson and 
McAfee (1983) model by combining the Reinganum and Rob 
models. Rauh (2007) extends B´enabou (1993) and prove 
existence of equilibrium in pure strategies under two distinct 
sets of assumptions. The first standard set directly 
generalize B´enabou model. The second general set allows 
for heterogeneity in buyers’ search costs, demand functions 
and firms’ cost functions 
Another type of search models pioneered by Kiyotaki and 
Wright (1991, 1993), frictions are introduced through 
random bilateral matching and private trading histories, in 
the context of decentralized exchanges, (Kocherlakota, 
1998). Without money, it is difficult for agents conduct 
socially desirable trades. Money becomes necessary to 
facilitate trade and increase social welfare. Agent use money 
instead of barter to trade efficiently as any two traders 
require only single coincidence of wants.  
The construction of search models is a step towards 
establishing general equilibrium in a macroeconomic model 
that is not marred with perfect competition. Curiously 
enough, such models expose serious inefficiencies of the 
conventional economy. Despite the use of money, general 
equilibrium remains inefficient, albeit not as inefficient as 
                                                            
2 The paper focuses on price search models. There is another class of labor search and survival models reviewed by 
Canals et al (2002). 
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the barter exchange model. 
OPTIMALITY IN SEARCH MODELS 
We can therefore use the search model for two purposes. The 
first is to see if the introduction of money in the economy in 
the face of costly information, while keeping the classical 
loan contract, overcomes the hurdles of barter while 
ushering the economy to efficient frontiers. 
The second, is to check whether the removal of the classical 
loan contract and its substitution by the Islamic investment 
and finance contracts, or Islamic finance properly 
implemented would remove any remaining inefficiencies 
from the search model.  
INEFFICIENCIES SURFACING IN THE SEARCH MODEL 
Any two trading agents have either asymmetric bargaining 
powers or asymmetric demands for the goods each wishes to 
exchange with the other. 
The lack of double coincidence of wants can be manifested 
in the form of asymmetric demands, but not necessary to 
justify the use of money in a search model, Engineer and Shi 
(1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001). In other 
words, barter exchange would still work without money if it 
suffers from asymmetric demand, if asymmetric matches 
can be reached. 
Money facilitates exchanges in asymmetric matches. The 
use of money can be justified, based on facilitating exchange 
and improving social welfare where the two agents have only 
single coincidence of wants. The introduction of money goes 
a long way in rehabilitating barter exchange and increasing 
the scope of exchange and division of labor. 
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However, monetary equilibrium in such models suffers from 
two types of inefficiency. First, because agents ignore the 
externalities, as their search improves their partners’ 
matching probabilities, the number of trades is inefficient. 
This is called the Hosios type inefficiency that results in a 
search economy (Hosios, 1990). Second, because buyers in 
each match are constrained by the available real money 
balance, the quantity of goods in each trade is inefficient. 
This is called the Friedman-Samuelson inefficiency 
(Samuelson, 1958; Friedman, 1969) that results from a 
positive monetary rate of interest. 
I. THE HOSIOS TYPE INEFFICIENCY 
In a monetary economy, where money is actually and 
justifiably used, information would be costly and searching 
by economic agents would be a necessary outcome. Buyers 
and sellers would search for the best match. 
Understandably, search efforts would be significant for 
large-value items, bought individually or in a bunch, e.g., 
weekly, monthly, or seasonal shopping as well as when 
durables are purchased by households and factors of 
production are purchased by firms. In such cases, the 
resources spent on search would be significant and may 
affect the research outcome.  
Apparently, research models implicitly assume divisibility 
across the board, which makes this factor insignificant. 
Naturally, this occurs in exchanges involving large 
quantities on commodities to be traded in bulk, durables, or 
factors of production. In such cases, agents would spend 
proportionately higher amounts on price searching. 
Spending on search for any item would not be uniform for 
all traders. Those who spend relatively more, gain more 
information. 
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Gains from search would be unevenly distributed between 
trading partners. Those who spend more resources in search 
and gain more information about the available prices and 
counterparties, have no way of internalizing such externality 
through selling some of the information they collected to 
some trading agents. 
Knowing that the surplus information, once obtained by a 
trader is not sellable, i.e., it cannot be internalized, traders 
will curtail the number of transactions in high-value items. 
In other words, the volume of transactions would be below 
optimal 
II. THE FRIEDMAN-SAMUELSON INEFFICIENCY 
The Friedman-Samuelson inefficiency related to positive 
interest rate has been discovered earlier before the 
introduction of search models. Monetary economists found 
that a zero-nominal interest rate is a necessary condition for 
the optimal allocation of resources (Samuelson, 1958; 
Friedman, 1969). The reason is simple.  In a world with fiat 
money, adding one marginal unit of real balances costs no 
real resources to the community.  Therefore, imposing a 
positive price on the use of money would lead traders to 
economize on the use of money in transactions, in their 
pursuit to minimize their transactions costs.  They would 
therefore use some real resources instead of money in 
transactions.  However, when the rate of interest is zero, 
traders will have no incentive to substitute real resources for 
money.  Additional real resources can therefore be released 
for consumption and investment. 
When this matter was investigated within general 
equilibrium models, it was found that a zero interest rate is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for allocative 
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efficiency (Cole & Kocherlakota, 1998; Chari & Kehoe 1996; 
Wilson, 1979).  Though these theoretical results are 
dependent on some simplifying assumptions, they have been 
found to be robust in a variety of models (Correia and Teles, 
1997).   
Milton Friedman suggests steadily contracting the money 
supply at a rate equal to the representative household time 
preference (Friedman, 1969, p. 34 quoted by Ireland, 2000).  
Accordingly, economists continued to search for the set of 
monetary policies that would bring the rate of interest to 
zero, in order to reach an optimal allocation of resources.  
They depended on the relationship known as the Fisher 
hypothesis, which decomposes (in the terms used by St. 
Amant, 1996) the nominal interest rate as the sum of the 
expected inflation rate and ex ante real interest rate:  
Therefore, it appears that deflating the economy at a rate 
equal to the real rate of interest would automatically set the 
(nominal) rate of interest to zero.  This would be the optimal 
monetary policy rule that insures that financial resources 
are allocated efficiently.  
Such policy rule clearly implies that the optimal rate of 
inflation is negative. However, Central bankers would never 
seriously advocate a long-run policy of deflation (Wolman, 
1997)3.  
Deflating the economy would bring with it several problems 
both conceptually and practically. Conceptually, economists 
would naturally worry about the existence of a liquidity trap 
when the rate of interest is zero (Uhlig, Harald, 2000). 
Another conceptual problem is what happens with the 
volume of money supply that is shrinking over time. 
                                                            
3 Economists also recommended the application of 100 percent required reserve ratio.  However, policy-makers 
have not been impressed, despite the obvious benefits. 
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Practicalities mandate that such volume would be 
(numerically) sufficient to carry out transactions at the 
current price level. Economists as they often do, assume 
divisibility. Therefore, money can be used in infinitesimally 
small denominations, so that a dollar can be broken into 
cents and cents can be broken into smaller parts and so on. 
This may go on and on until money vanishes.  
Several economists point out that deflationary policies have 
to be exercised only asymptotically in order to apply the 
Friedman’s Rule (Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998). Asymptotic 
behavior of deflation is a claim that can conflict with the rule 
that it should be equal to the real rate of return. It is not 
perceivable in a growing economy to have a real rate of 
return that behaves asymptotically.   
Some claim that even if the asymptotic conditions are not 
fulfilled, short term constraints on monetary policy can do 
the job (Ireland, 2000).  Others may worry that when the rate 
of interest becomes very low, monetary authorities have less 
leeway with adjusting it downwards in the face of recession.  
Meanwhile, some economists respond by proposing 
alternative ways to overcome the zero-bound on interest rate 
policy (Goodfriend, 2000).  Another conceptual problem is 
that deflation has efficiency problems parallel to those of 
inflation, even at very low interest rates (Lucas, 1994).  
However, the welfare cost of implementing a zero rate of 
interest has been found negligible (Wolman, 1997).    
Many economists appear to dismiss the practical and 
conceptual problems involved with zero interest rates. 
Nonetheless, monetary authorities are not yet impressed.  
No monetary authority has so far come forward to adopt the 
optimal monetary policy rule. However, all economists, when 
analyzing the zero-bound interest rates, they neglect the 
undeniable fact that both inflation and deflation have similar 
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inefficiency effects. This means that any policy that sets 
inflation or deflation targets, no matter how small. Is still 
inefficient. The Friedman’s optimal rule is therefor hardly 
optimal. 
WOULD ISLAMIC FINANCE TREAT BOTH INEFFICIENCIES? 
The availability of money through the classical loan contract, 
i.e., the purchase of spot money for future money at a 
premium, causes both types of inefficiency. Friedman-
Samuelson inefficiency is assured because of the positive 
interest rate. Hosios inefficiency exists too because the 
process of finance does not interfere with asymmetric 
matches.   
The shift to Islamic finance would have to involve few 
institutional changes (Al-Jarhi, 1981). 
First, banks would give up the use of the classical loan 
contract in favor of 20 or investment and finance contracts 
that can be grouped into four categories of equity, profit and 
product sharing, agency investment, and sale finance. 
Second, all money issued by the central bank would be 
placed in investment accounts with banks, called central 
deposits or CD’s while total reserves are observed. Third, the 
central bank issues central deposit certificates, CDC’s whose 
proceeds would be placed in CD’s. The central bank would 
conduct monetary policy through changing the money 
supply by adding or withdrawing from CD’s. Fine tuning 
would be done through open market operations in CDC’s. 
the rate of return on CDC’s, or RCDC, would become a good 
indicator of the real rate of growth. 
The optimal monetary policy rule would become to equate 
the rate of monetary expansion with the rate of growth, 
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which is calculated from RCDC4. Absolute price stability, 
instead of target inflation or deflation, would be the natural 
result of such policy. 
Instead of an administratively determined rate of interest on 
loans whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the 
virtue of the classical loan contract, the RCDC is paid on 
Mudaraba deposits whose principle and return are not 
guaranteed. People would allocate their savings between 
different investment outlets, based on comparing RCDC with 
the rates of return on other investments. The incentive to 
economize on real balances in transactions would be 
eliminated, as there would be no incentive in a growing 
economy to add monetary balances to investment deposits 
for the sake of earning an uncertain rate of profit, coupled 
with the possibility of loss. The Friedman Samuelson would 
consequently disappear. 
The availability of finance through the 20 Islamic financial 
contracts, i.e., through profit and product partnership, 
investment agency and sale finance can have positive effects 
on the process of trading.  
Traders, knowing that banks are good sources of 
information regarding prices and trading partners, the 
would not take time out of their productive activities to 
search. Even if they have sufficient liquidity, when saving in 
the search cost is considered, prices for deferred payment 
net of search cost would favor obtaining finance from banks 
than liquidating their own “invested resources.” To finance 
their purchases. This leads to division of labor in the search 
activities, where banks specialize and become more efficient 
                                                            
4 The rate of return on aggregate investment would be equal to a weighted average of the rates of return on all 
investments in the economy, where weights are the value of resources invested in each. The RCDC would be equal 
to the average profitability of aggregate investment or the real rate of growth minus the Mudareb fee charged by 
banks investing CDC proceeds and the central bank fee in lieu of its intermediation between CDC holders and 
banks. 
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in information collection and dissemination. While 
individual traders find themselves at a comparative 
disadvantage in information search, they cannot sell any 
surplus information they might collect to other traders. 
Their information-collection activities become rather 
unproductive. 
Banks meanwhile, expecting that traders, both buyers and 
sellers will refer to them as sources of trading information, 
they accumulate a portfolio of trading information through 
systematic and professional search they would bargain with 
suppliers on attractive prices that would provide buyers 
what they consider good deals and afford them comfortable 
profit margins. The information collected by banks in their 
search activities would be directly translated into 
improvement in matching possibilities of each trader and 
internalized through better prices for both buyers and sellers 
and better profit margins for banks. 
In brief, by providing sale finance, banks play a catalytic role 
in matching buyers and sellers and distributing the 
externalities of improving match opportunities to trade 
partners as well as banks themselves, so that such 
externalities can be completely internalized. The 
improvement in the efficiency in the search activities due the 
division of labor, and the resulting incentives provided to 
traders, would expand rather restrict the volume of 
transactions in commodities. 
On the investment side, banks in an Islamic economic 
system specialize in investment activities. Their 
specialization enables them to better handle the lemon 
problem through feasibility studies, financial analyses, and 
governance. Their expertise in investment evaluation makes 
them more capable to conduct due diligence. Their 
participation in business management boards, on their own 
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behalf or on as agents to their customers, would protect their 
investments from risks associated with information 
asymmetry. This would further enable them to provide their 
investment partners with larger volumes of finance through 
Mudaraba, Salam and Wakala, which can be subject to 
information asymmetry. 
In other words, banks undertaking of equity finance, would 
enable them to provide more finance as partnership in 
product and profit, in addition to Mudaraba, Wakala and 
Salam. The participation of banks in capital subscription 
provides a signal to other investors that a sufficient amount 
of due diligence has been done to avoid the lemon problem. 
This would be instrumental in attracting other equity 
investors to the same venture. The same applies to 
Mudaraba, Salam and Wakala finance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of search costs into the macroeconomic 
model exposes two inefficiencies that have not generally 
been made apparent to mainstream economists, because the 
construction of search models has been a nascent 
phenomenon. In the first type of inefficiency, search 
activities would not be uniform among traders. Those who 
do more searching would be unable to internalize their extra 
information by selling it to others. Such gains from search 
would become a deadweight loss. Lack of internalization 
leads traders to limit their search activities which would lead 
to keeping the volume of transactions below optimum. This 
is termed the Hosios inefficiency. 
The existence of a positive rate of interest in a search 
economy, would entice economic agents to economize on 
cash balances and carry out a volume of transactions that 
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is less than optimal. In addition, they would attempt to 
substitute real resources for money in transactions, thereby 
reducing total output and lowering efficiency. This is termed 
the Samuelson-Friedman inefficiency.  
Switching form an interest-based finance to Islamic finance 
would serve two purposes at the same time. First, money 
would have no positive guaranteed rate of return, and 
consequently, traders have no incentive to economize on 
money in transactions. The volume of real balances used in 
transactions would reach its optimum. Second, all search 
externalities related to significant trading deals would be 
internalized to trading partners through banks providing 
Islamic finance, through both sale and partnership finance. 
On both counts, Islamic finance is a winner.  
The limitation of this theory is obvious. The ability of Islamic 
finance to correct for both types of inefficiencies will be 
extremely weakened with Islamic banks mimicking 
conventional banks. In such case, the Islamic finance 
contracts would be shunned and replaced by camouflage 
contracts, which does not involve real trading or real 
investment. A great deal of added value would therefore be 
lost by Islamic finance. 
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